Quasi-hyperbolic discounting in Markov decision processes

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Speaker: Anna Jaśkiewicz – Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Poland

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 962 7774 9870
Passcode: 285404

The Markov decision processes under quasi-hyperbolic discounting are studied. This type of discounting nicely models human behaviour, which is time-inconsistent in the long run. The decision maker has preferences changing in time. Therefore, the standard approach based on the Bellman optimality principle fails. Within a dynamic game-theoretic framework, the existence of randomised stationary Markov perfect equilibria for a large class of Markov decision processes with transitions having a density function is proved. Moreover, under some additional conditions, this equilibrium can be replaced by a deterministic one. During the talk many examples will be discussed to illustrate our results, including a portfolio selection model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.