David Plunkett, "On the Nature and Foundations of Epistemic Normativity"

Colloquium Series

"On the Nature and Foundations of Epistemic Normativity"

David Plunkett, Dartmouth College
Coauthored with Tristram McPherson (Ohio State University)

Friday, October 7, 2022
3:30-5:30 PM EST
Leacock 927

Abstract:
Many of the epistemic conditions that philosophers are interested in – such as knowledge, justification, and understanding – seem to be “normative” in an important sense. Put roughly: such epistemic conditions seem to not only be tied to standards that we can conform to, but also ones that matter in more significant ways than the rules of a randomly chosen social club. But is the idea that epistemology is “normative” correct? And, if so, how exactly should we understand what the normativity of epistemic standards consists in? In this paper, we explore some of the complexities of these questions and chart a range of possible answers. A core part of this discussion involves exploring three different topics, and how they interact: 1) theories of normativity, 2) theories of the epistemic, and 3) different ways of understanding the claim that epistemology (or some epistemic condition) is normative. On the last front, we distinguish three different foundational projects that philosophers can engage in with respect to epistemology: what we call the projects of “metaepistemology”, “substantive normative epistemology”, and the “conceptual ethics of epistemology”. We illustrate how our discussion can help illuminate important aspects of debates in epistemology, and possible ways forward, including in debates about ideology and ideology critique, moral encroachment, and the debate between pragmatists and evidentialists.